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ABSTRACT 
The investment criterion with road pricing is derived from a simple aggregate model of a road system. 
The model treats capacity and standard as joint products. The criterion implies that capacity should be expanded 
when the congestion component of revenue from road pricing per unit of capacity plus benefits of improved 
standard exceed the cost of adding a unit of capacity. Road pricing based on short run marginal cost will thus not 
in general provide proper financial incentives for investment. Whether the revenue from road pricing will cover 
the cost of the road system will in addition to the economies of scale in road construction also depend on the 
magnitude of the "standard" component. In an urban road system there may also be strong interdependencies 
between different projects as shown by an example from Oslo. This makes the provision of urban roads unsuitable 
for decentralized decisionmaking and thus also for a market solution. While road pricing may not provide the 
proper guidelines for investment envisaged by "standard" theory and we still have a long way to go before we are 
able to calculate the correct prices to apply, even very crude road pricing schemes can probably improve on the 
present situation in many urban areas. This is exemplified by estimates from Oslo. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The theory of road pricing is well established. The speed-flow relationship for a road link, derived from 
traffic theory, is usually a starting point. While this "standard" approach highlights the basic principles, it also 
simplifies to the extent that many important aspects of road pricing may be overlooked. The theory can in 
principle also be extended to a road network in aggregate. In this case we must interprete changes in the volume 
of traffic as proportional change in the elements of a vehicle trip matrix and use aggregate measures as average 
trip time and average trip length for matrix. Again, while this might provide some additional insights both with 
regard to the impacts of changes in the lee! of traffic and with regard to the impacts of different road projects, it 
also hides some important aspects. In practice, the application of the principle of road pricing to a road network 
is not without complications. The problems that emerge in application of the theory on the network level, have 
implications for several issues, including the possible benefits from private ownership and operation of roads. In 
the following, a road investment criterion with road pricing for a road network in aggregate, is derived. Then some 
of the problems that emerge in application of the theory to the network level, along with examples from Oslo and 
their implications, will be discussed. 
2. THE COST OF ROAD TRAFFIC 
The cost of road traffic consists of three major components, that is: 
- The cost of providing and maintaining the infrastructure 
- The cost to the users of the system 
- The environmental cost caused by the road system and the use of the system 
The first component corresponds to the capital- and operating costs of the infrastructure. The second 
component is the value of travel time and the operating cost of the vehicles using the system. The last component 
is the cost of noise, air pollution and barrier impact of roads. We might also include the cost of accidents to non-
motorized traffic under environmental cost. For a model of road system we here define the following variables: 
X =the number of vehicle trips per unit of time 
L = the length of the road system in kilometers 
S = q""L; a variable defining the capacity and standard of the road system (q is average capacity per kilometer of 
road) 
k = XJS is an indicator for the utilization of capacity 
In general the variables can be considered as vectors, but to keep the notation simple we use scalars. X 
should be interpreted as the number of trips in a vehicle trip matrix. A marginal increase in Xis the result of a 
small proportional increase in all the cells of the trip matrix. 
The central variable is S. In a road system, the capacity and standard are very often joint products when 
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road projects are implemented. If an existing road is improved or new road is constructed in order to increase 
capacity, the standard will usually be improved at the same time. It is not easy to give precise definitions of 
standard and capacity inroad systems. Loosely speaking, it is all the aspects of a road system that influence driving 
speeds, driving distances and operating costs of vehicles under non-congested driving conditions. While a precise 
definition of capacity itself is difficult, we can at least relate an increase capacity to the observation that the 
difference between average trip time in peak and off-peak has decreased, provided average trip time is measured 
for the same vehicle trip matrices before and after the change in the road system. The only way to have a pure 
increase in capacity without any standard component is probably to add lanes to existing roads. At the planning 
stage of a new road link we can - of course- consider a pure expansion of capacity, for example from 4 to 6 lanes. 
However, the point is that the introduction of a new link by itself will influence the standard of the road system 
because driving time and/or driving distance between some of the origins and destinations will decrease. 
An obvious example of increased standard is the replacement of a signalized intersection by a ramp 
junction. This \viii increase the capacity of the junction and the road links approaching the junction. However, in 
non-congested periods stops will avoid at the junction and this usually means considerable time savings. 
Replacing a signalized intersection by a roundabout may not make much difference with regard to delays, but off-
peak it may approximate the effect of a ramp junction. 
On the other hand, if a link in the road system is improved with the primary purpose of improving the 
standard, the capacity of the system will usually increase at the same time. This is normally the case in rural areas. 
Depending on the particular change in the road system we are looking at, the relative importance of the standard 
and the capacity component varies. 
Using a single variable to represent both capacity and standard is admittedly not an ideal solution, but 
we avoid additional variables and functions that are not essential to the argument. Also, any measures or indices 
we can construct as indicatiors of standard or capacity in road system will probably depend on variables like q and 
Land be non-decreasing in a variable like S. 
We will assume that the cost of the road infrastructure is a function of the length of the system (L), the 
average capacity per kilometer ( q) and the traffic in the system (X). This cost function is defined as: 
CI = L·f(S,X) (!) 
The cost to the users of the system is defined as: 
CU = X.g(S,k) (2) 
where g(S,k) is average user cost per vehicle trip and is a function of the standard of the road system (S) and the 
road system (S) and the load on the road system (k). 
The environmental cost function is written as: 
CE= m(X,q,L) (3) 
The signs of the partial derivatives of these functions are obvious except for Om/Oq (the partial derivative 
of m with respect to q) and om/oL (the partial derivative of m with respect to L). These may depend on the actual 
projects involved at any time. We have presented these cost functions in their general form, as more detailed 
description of them is not essential to the argument. We will also assume that Lis constant and concentrate on 
q and X as variables. However, q and Lenters nearly symmetrical in the model, so most conclusions with regard 
to q carries over to L. (In a mroe detailes model we could also replace q by variables that would allow us to 
distinguish between the number of lanes and capacity per la,t:1e. 
3. INVESTMENT WITH ROAD PRICING 
Ideally the task of a road authority is to choose q (and L) such that the total cost of the system is minimized 
for any volume of traffic, that is: 
minimize C = CI + CU + CE 
The first order condition of a minimum with respect to q is: 
oc1oq = L. oftoq + x. ogtos. L- L. k'. ogtok + omtoq = o 
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Equation (5) can be interpreted to say that benefits shall equal the cost for the marginal project, and 
implicitly determines q as function of X i.e. 
q = h(X) (6) 
This allows us to write the long run marginal cost per vehicle trip as: 
dC/dX = oC/oq . dq/dX + oC/oX (7) 
However, from equation (5) oC/liq = 0. Consequently dC/dX = oC/oX. This is a standard result in 
economic theory: When the infrastructure is optimal, given the volume of traffic, then short and long run marginal 
cost of increased traffic will coincide. Short run marginal cost in this model is given by: 
oC/oX = L·of/oX + om/oX + g(S,k) + k·(og/ok) (8) 
Motorists pay their own cost in terms of the time used for the trip and vehicle operating cost, i.e. the 
average cost g(S,k). Marginal cost pricing implis a price per trip (p) equal to: 
p = L·of/oX + om/oX + k·(og/ok) (9) 
where k·(og/ok) is the marginal congestion cost, om/oX is the cost of wear and tear on the roads and om/oX is the 
marginal environmental cost. We can solve for k·(og/ok) in equation (9) and substitute the expression into (5) to 
have: 
X/S.(p- L.Uf/UX- OmtUX)-X"(UgiUS) = Uf/Uq + OmtOq l/L (10) 
\vhich is the investment criterion with road pricing. In equation (10), ()f/cSq is the cost of a marginal increase in 
capacity per kilometer of road. -X·(og/oS) is the benefits due to increased standard. om/liq is the environmental 
cost of a marginal increase in capacity per kilometer of road. The first term on the left hand side 
X·(p - of/oX - om/oX)/S" is the revenue from congestion pricing per unit of capacity. Equation (10) can be 
interpreted in the following way: 
When the revenue per unit of capacity from the congestion component of road pricing plus the benefits from 
inzproved standard, is equal to the cost of adding an additional unit of capacity (corrected for any environmental 
impact), then capacity should be increased. 
In standard economic theory, the "rules" are that we shall set prices at short run marginal cost and expand 
capacity when revenue per unit of capacity equals the cost of adding a unit of capacity. The only deviation from 
standard economic theory is thus that there will be a user cost saving from capacity expansion that is not captured 
by the revenue from road pricing. This user cost saving is a result of the standard improving component of road 
investments. 
In off-peak periods, the revenue from congestion pricing will be zero or very small, but there may be 
considerable user cost savings from improved standard. The same will be the case for parts of the road system even 
in congested periods. Consequently the revenue from road pricing will not be an appropriate measure ofb.enefits. 
An interesting issue - both from a theoretical and from a practical point of view - is whether the revenue 
from "correct" road pricing can provide useful signals as to where and how to invest in an urban road network. 
In rural areas, the benefits from most road investments can mainly be attributed to improved standard. 
investments in ne\v roads and road improvements are madel long before traffic volumes reach levels that cause 
congestion of any important magnitude. This policy also makes sense from an economic point of view when there 
is an important standard component involved. Due to the fact that capacity and standard in practice appear as 
joint products, capacity will also increase even if there is no congestion. This is not an original observation.Jansson 
(1984) is, for example, very clear on this issue. 
The point to be emphazised here, is that the standard component in road investment is important even 
in urban areas with considerable congestion in peak periods. 
In addition to the example of intersections mentioned earlier, we may have the case where a new or 
improved road allows an increase in speed also in off-peak periods or where a new road decreases the distance 
of driving between different origins and destinations. Two implications follow from these observations: 
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i) Road pricing will - in general - not make cost-benefit analysis of road projects in congested road networks 
redundant. This would be the case if only capacity is involved and the environmental impact of a road project 
is included in investment cost as compensation to property owners, because all benefits and costs would then 
be in financial terms. 
ii) Whether marginal cost pricing of road use in urban areas will provide enough revenue to cover the cost of 
the road system is not only a matter of the economies of scale and invisibilities in the provision of road 
capacity. It also depends on the magnitude of the "standard" component in benefits. In general no firm 
conclusion can be drawn on the relative importance of these factors. 
Observations i) and ii) have also implications for privatization of the road system. We can not expect that 
a system with privately owned and operated roads will provide a road system that is optimally designed and where 
the users of the system are charged the "correct" price, i.e marginal cost. This does not mean that we should not 
be interested in promoting private operation of roads. It only means that we can not expect - in general - that a 
private market for provision of roads will give us an "optimum" road system and with "correct" pricing of the road 
services. 
The simple model we presented above allowed some conclusions to be drawn for a road network in 
general. A model that starts from a stylized speed-flow relationship for single road-link tend to focus on capacity 
and misses the standard or quality aspect of a road system. It is possible to elaborate more on a model resembling 
the one above. Instead of minimizing cost, we can maximize social surplus with respect to p and q and thus 
explicitly introduce the demand side. 
However, to really analyze the pricing, investment and revenue issues, we have to use models that treat 
the netwo4rk explicitly, and not as an aggregate entity. 
4. CAN WE APPLY "CORRECT" ROAD PRICING? 
It seems to be a common opinion that modern electronic systems may offer the possibility of applying 
"correct" pricing in urban road systems. There is no doubt that such systems can monitor the vehicles and the 
traffic flows very accurately. However there is still a long way to go before it is possible to ca,lculate the correct 
congestion cost that should be charged to vehicles. A congested urban road system is more accurately described 
as a system of more or less effective bottlenecks where queueing theory in principle applies, than by a system of 
road links where the speed-flow relationship applies. In reality, the intersections are usually more important than 
the links as a cause of congestion. 
As an example, assume a bottleneck and a sudden increase in the traffic flow approaching the bottleneck. 
The increase in the flow makes the bottleneck become effective and a queue will be formed. The size of the queue 
and the average and total delay to vehicles in the queue depend on several parameters. However, the important 
fact is that the delay a vehicle inflicts on other vehicles in the queue varies considerably. The first vehicles 
exceeding the capacity inflicts a very high congestion cost on other vehicles. From then on the marginal congestion 
cost decreases more or less monotonously until the queue dissolves. 
It is difficult to use observations from the queue at a bottleneck as basis for congestion pricing even in 
the simplest of cases. We do not know the marginal congestion cost of the first vehicle in the queue until the queue 
is dissolved and that may be an hour or more after the first vehicle has left the road system. 
Another problem - mainly due to intersections and turning movements - is that a vehicle may inflict 
considerable delays on vehicles using other links. The complications that arise from this fact is also reflected in 
the difficulty of modelling assymetric traffic assignment. 
Consequently applying congestion pricing - even with the most sophisticated electronic schemes - can 
only be done in a very rough and approximate way compared to the "correct" pricing. The problem is not one of 
having the approximate electronic scheme, but rather our abJ.lity to model real life traffic systems and from this 
to infer the correct price to charge. It might take a considerable time and effort before we can assert a "correct" 
marginal cost. However, the difficulty of charging "correctly" for congestion, is not a serious obstacle to road 
pricing. A movement of prices in the right direction can improve considerably on the present situation, even if 
we only end up with another suboptimal situation with regards to efficiency in the traffic system. 
5. APPRAISAL OF ROAD PROJECT IN A NETWORK SETTING 
Whether we start out from a simple theory of pricing and investment in roads derived from speed - flow 
relationship for a single link or from a similar exercise generalized for a road network, we reach some conclusions 
on investment criteria. However, their application to the road network is not without problems. In dealing with 
road projects in a network setup, one has to realize that there might be a great degree of interdependence between 
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the benefits of different projects. The main cause of interdependence is the interplay between many bottlenecks 
and drivers route choice in the system. This has two implications: 
i) In general the appraisal of investment projects - especially in congested networks should be based on a 
comprehensive analysis of different projects and project combinations. The analysis must take into account 
the impact on the total system. 
ii) Making decisions on road investment is not a task suitable for decentralized decision making. 
The second point implies that it is difficult to imagine that a road network resembling some kind of an 
optimum network can arise as a market solution in a competitive market even without any standard component. 
Some of the issues raised above can be examplified by the results from two recent studies undertaken in 
Oslo. One deals with road project appraisal and the other with the costs and benefits of the cordon toll scheme 
in Oslo. 
6. BENEFITS OF ROAD PROJECTS IN OSLO 
The cordon toll scheme in Oslo was introduced to raise money for a large scale road investment program 
for the main roads in the region. The net revenue from the toll scheme shall supplement funds from the central 
government. With some 70 road projects under consideration and period of implementation that is 15 years, 
it is worthwhile to investigate the benefits of different project combinations and different alternatives for 
scheduling the projects within this period (Larsen 1991). 
Figure 1 shows the results from the evaluation of two projects when each of them are added separately 
to the present network and when each of them are added with the other one already in the network. Both projects 
are now under construction. 
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Figure 1: VALUE OF SAVINGS IN TRAVEL 
TIME AND OPERATING COST OF VEHICLES 
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Project B is a new road link in tunnel. It is an extension of the the main ring road in Oslo. In the context 
of the discussion presented earlier, this project implies a combination of improved capacity and increased 
standard. Project C adds an additional outbound lane to the main road going westward from Oslo. The project 
will not involve any important standard improvement and may be considered as a pure increase in capacity. The 
benefits in terms of time savings and reduction in operating cost of vehicles have been calculated by assigning 4 
fixed car trip matrices, representing different time periods, on the road network according to the user equilibrium 
principle. Different unit costs were applied for each matrix to take care of differences in the composition of traffic. 
The benefit for each time period is multiplied by the number of hours the matrix represent on a yearly basis. The 
distribution of benefits in the different time periods for project B, clearly shows that the "standard component" 
is quite important in this project. The benefits of project Care confined to the afternoon peak. 
If project C is already included in the network, the benefits of project B decrease. On the other hand, if 
B already is included in the network, the benefits of C become negative. This signals the presence of Braess 
paradox, which may be a real problem in congested networks (Florian, 1984). 
The two projects are clearly interdependent. To some extent they provide additional capacity for the 
same traffic flows, and in that case \Ve might expect, as the results show, a negative interdependence. 
Another example is shown in Table 1. Different combinations of 4 projects along the ring road was 
analyzed by the same method as in the previous example. There were 16 possible combinations for each matrix, 
and hence 64 traffic assignments were run. One of the projects was project Bin Figure 1. The other three projects 
, replace signalized intersections with ramp junctions. The distribution of benefits to traffic in different time 
periods was very similar to project B. We have thus another example showing considerable benefits in non-
congested periods where marginal cost pricing would yield very small revenue. Table 1 only sho\vs the benefit of 
the 4 projects when they are added as the first and the last respectively. 
Table 1: Annual benefits of four projects when they are added as the first and the last to the present network. 
(Million NOK)l) 
Project 
SS 
TU 
GF(B) 
NS 
Added first 
75.3 
23.3 
29.6 
12.4 
1) Value of time savings and savings in vehicle operating cost. 
Added last 
93.2 
49.2 
44.6 
-14.4 
In this case we found a strong positive interdependence between the benefits of three of the projects, 
wh_ile the last project had negative benefits when the other three projects had been included in the network. Thus 
we have another example of Braess paradox. Both examples above clearly show that decisions on selection and 
phasing of road projects in an urban system should be centralized, and that there is no reason to expect that a 
market would provide for the best solution. The case for decentralization and market solutions is strong when it 
is safe to assume that a major part of the benefits of a projects of a project is captured by the revenue from a project. 
In a congested road network, a major part of the benefits from a specific project might accrue to traffic in other 
parts of the system due to the effect on route choice, and may depend cruciaIIy on whether or when some other 
projects are implemented. 
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Figure 2 shows the accumulation of net annual benefits with the best and the worst sequence. Taken 
together Table 1 and Figure 2 clearly indicate the importance of looking at project combinations and sequences 
and of looking at the total impact on the traffic in the system. The analysis of the investment projects is based on 
constant vehicle trip matrices. This is a great simplification as any major road project may have long term impacts 
on mode choice, travel patterns and land use. However, even this simplified approach should capture amajorpart 
of the benefits related to time savings and operating cost savings. 
7. BENEFITS FROM ROAD PRICING 
The conclusion from paragraph 3 was that even a very crude form of road pricing might provide 
considerable benefits compared to the present situation. A cordon toll is one of the options in this regard. The 
present cordon toll scheme in Oslo was designed without any consideration being given to the principles of road 
pricing. The sole purpose of the scheme, at present, is to raise money for the road investment program. The scheme 
is operated for 24 hours a day around the week. Only inbound traffic is tolled. Seasonal tickets allowing an 
unlimited number of trips are extensively used and the toll rates do not vary by time of day for those who pay per 
trip. For the toll ring scheme in Oslo we have attempted to estimate the benefits of the present scheme and for 
an modified scheme. The modified scheme is still based on a cordon toll for inbound traffic, but the toll rates 
approximate the average marginal cost for vehicle trips crossing the toll ring (Ramjerdi and Larsen 1991). 
It is thus possible to compare the impact of a revenue raising scheme and the impact of modifying this 
scheme in the direction of road pricing. The modified scheme that we investigated is still a long way from proper 
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road pricing. A cordon toll based on marginal congestion cost implies that the toll is too high for some trips and 
too low for others. The estimate of average marginal cost is also based on the speed - flow relationship for links 
in the network. In this study we used variable demand assignment on combined vehicle trip/transit trip matrices. 
For each cell in the matrices ( 450 zones) we applied a demand function based on a logit model formulation. An 
equilibrium solution in this model imply that the actual times that enter in the demand functions corresponds to 
the actual times for vehicle trips between the different zones. The feedback from driving conditions to demand 
for vehicle trips is thus taken care of, although in a very simplified way. 
On the other hand, there are several effects of a cordon toll or road pricing in general, that the model is 
unable to capture. Differentiated rates by time of day will have an impact on the timing of trips. There will also 
be impacts on destination choice. In the long run we may expect greater impacts on travel patterns and land use. 
There might also be feedbacks that influence the level of service in public transit. One of the potential benefits 
of sophisticated road pricing, is also improved route choice in the road system. In technical terms this means that 
the system moves from a user equilibrium to a system optimum. A cordon toll like the one in Oslo has negligible 
impacts on route choice and thus will not improve on route choice. The results presented in the tables below are 
thus estimates of short term impacts based on very strict assumptions. However, they are estimates of the impacts 
that are usually emphasized in the theory of road pricing. 
Table 2: Estimated Benefits and Costs of Present Toll Scheme in Oslo. (Mill NOK per year) 
Time savings Operating cost Loss of Total 
savings surplus 
Peak periods 42.1 2.4 -6.3 38.3 
Between peaks 5.0 0.2 -7.0 -1.7 
Other periods 5.3 0.4 -20.4 -14.7 
Total 52.4 3.0 -33.6 21.9 
Source: Ramjerdi and Larsen, 1991. 
Table 2 shows the estimated benefits of the present system (disregarding environmental impacts). The 
cost of operating the system is an estimated 96.6 Million NOK per year and the cost of delays at toll gates was 
roughly estimated to 4.9 Million NOK per year. We see that the net benefits due to time savings and changes in 
consumer surplus are less then the cost of operating the present scheme. Thus it would not be worthwhile to 
implement the present scheme only to improve the efficiency in the traffic system. From the decrease in traffic 
and savings in users' cost it is possible to calculate an average marginal cost for the trips that switches to public 
transport. This is an average of the marginal cost in the no-toll situation and the marginal cost in the present 
situation. Average marginal cost is 35.60 NOK for peak periods, 3.80 NOK for between peaks, and 1.40 NOK for 
other periods. The cost of financing defined as the social cost per unit of net revenue is 0.158. This figure can be 
compared to the opportunity cost (or shadow price) of tax revenue. In Norway the opportunity cost might be in 
the range 0.3-0.4. The present toll scheme should thus be a less costly way ofraising revenue than general taxation 
on the margin. 
Table 2 shows the estimated benefits and cost of the improved scheme. We assumed that tolls would only 
be charged in peak periods because the present gasoline tax in Norway is sufficiently high to cover the marginal 
cost in off-peak periods. 
Table 3: Estimated Benefits and Costs of Improved Toll Scheme in Oslo. (Mill NOK per year) 
Time savings Operating cost Loss of Total 
savings surplus 
Peak periods 108.5 6.0 -19.4 95.2 
Between peaks 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Other periods 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Total 108.5 6.0 -19.4 95.2 
Source: Ramjerdi and Larsen, 1991. 
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The revenue estimated for the modified sheme was 180 Million NOK per year and the annual cost of toll 
collection of toll collection was estimated at70 Million NOK per year. The estimates for the modified toll scheme 
thus suggest that it would have benefits that exceed the costs and would be worthwhile to introduce in order to 
improve even if it is very crude compared to the road pricing advocated in theory. 
As earlier it is possible to calculate the average marginal cost of the trips that switches to public transport. 
For peak periods this average marginal cost is29.5 NOK. As expected, this is higher than 25 NOK, the "optimum" 
toll. 
As the benefits of the modified scheme has benefits that exceed the costs, the cost of financing in this 
alternative is negative as it should be cases if we introduce a price or tax to improve resource allocation. The toll 
paid by the users is a revenue to the authority collecting the toll and is thus a transfer payment. This transfer 
payment that is one of the major obstacles to the introduction of road pricing from a political point of view. The 
revenue in Table 1 is a good estimate of the revenue from the present system and the estimated revenue for the 
modified scheme is less than one third of the present revenue. The users in aggregate will thus pay fare less with 
a cordon toll only in the peak periods even with a toll rate that is two and a half time the present toll rate for light 
vehicles. In principle the net revenue can be distributed in a way that makes everybody better off. The crucial point 
is probably to use the revenue in way that avoids giving the impression that road pricing is just another increase 
in taxes. Whether this is best done by using the revenue for some purpose that directly benefits those who pay or 
by including road pricing in a package that imply reduction in other taxes, will depend on the local circumstances. 
8. SOME CONCLUDING REFLECTIONS ON ROAD PRICING AND 
PRIVATIZATION OF ROADS 
Available evidence indicate that there might be considerable benefits to be gained from introducing road 
pricing in congested cities. However, the standard theory, taking as a starting point the speed-flow relationship 
provided by traffic theory, is too simple to apply directly to actual road networks. At present we are not able to 
model traffic flows in congested road networks in a way that allows us calculate the "correct" price to charge. 
Neither are we able to model the interplay between demand responses and network impacts to the extent that 
we can have precise estimates of costs and benefits. These are not problems that can be solved by sophisticated 
electronic schemes for charging the motorists. 
Even if "theoretically correct" road pricing is impossible to implement at present, crude road pricing 
schemes might improve considerably on the present situation in most congested urban areas. 
A "simple" theory on road pricing might lead us to believe that we can do away with cost-benefit analysis 
in the appraisal of road projects and instead rely on revenue from road pricing, cost and profit to provide the 
correct signals for investments. This is wrong for two reasons: 
1) There is an important "standard" component in road investments, even in congested networks. With 
marginal cost pricing there will be no increase in financial revenue that corresponds to increased standard. 
Motorists are of course willing to pay for improved road standard in non-congested periods. However, to 
make them pay, we have to leave marginal cost pricing. 
2) In general strong interdependencies may exist among road projects. We have to assess specific road 
investments from the impacts they have on the total traffic in the network. 
To some extent the question of privatization or private provision of roads, is related to these issues. If 
privatization shall have something to offer when it comes to the road system, it must be based on an assumption 
that the private sector will do better than the public sector. In general we might argue that the private sector is 
more efficient than the public sector, and privatization might help us to avoid "overdesigned" roads and provide 
more efficient maintenance. On the other hand, networks are notoriously difficult to analyze as market 
phenomenons and there is no priori reason to expect that a market-in general-is better able to handle the pricing 
and investment decisions related to congested road networks networks than the public sector. 
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